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Abstract
Social security contributions in most countries are split between employers and
employees. According to standard incidence analysis, social security contributions
a¤ect employment negatively, but it is irrelevant how they are divided between
employers and employees. This paper considers the possibility that: (i) work-
ers perceive a linkage between current contributions and future benets and, (ii)
they value employers contributions less than own contributions, as the former are
less salient. Under these assumptions, I nd that employer contributions have
a stronger (negative) e¤ect on employment than employee contributions. Further-
more, a change in how contributions are divided that reduces the share of employers
is benecial for employment. Finally, making employers contributions more visible
to workers also has a positive e¤ect on employment.
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1 Introduction
Tax incidence studies the e¤ect of taxes on the distribution of welfare in a society. Its
basic insight is that the person who really pays the tax may not be the person who has
the legal obligation to make a tax payment (Fullerton and Metcalf (2002)). For example,
if government taxes capital, owners of capital can pass on some or even all of the tax to
consumers through higher prices or to workers through lower wages. Economists distin-
guish between statutory incidence, who is legally responsible for the tax, and economic
incidence, the change in the distribution of welfare induced by the tax. They di¤er in
that individuals react to taxes by changing their behavior and, consequently, equilibrium
prices may also change. As another example, think of payroll taxes. In the USA, the
statutory burden of the payroll tax is the same for employers and employees. However,
it is generally agreed that the economic burden is borne entirely by workers.1 It is not
surprising that economists mainly focus on economic incidence.
The textbook prediction of economic theory is that, when markets are competitive, the
economic incidence of a tax will be determined by the elasticities of demand and supply,
but not by statutory incidence.2 In the context of the labor market, this implies that an
increase of contributions paid by employers has the same negative e¤ect on employment
as an increase of the same size in contributions paid by employees. Moreover, any change
in how contributions are split between employers and employees that keeps the total level
of contribution xed, has no e¤ect either on the level of employment or on the total cost
of labor.3 Quoting Salanié (2003, p. 16):
Whether the employer pays80 percent or 50 percent or 20 percent of payroll taxes
is immaterial to the equilibrium gross and net wages and to the determination of employ-
ment.
I here challenge this view in a purely competitive labor market. I nd that the
particular way in which payroll taxes are split between employers and employees truly
matters, both for gross and net wages and also for employment. To obtain this result I
depart from standard analysis by introducing two assumptions:
1. Workers perceive these taxes paid as equivalent to deferred payments and, therefore,
not as pure taxes.
1Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
2Statutory incidence matters for real incidence when there is a (binding) minimum price.
3This result does not extend to non-competitive labor markets. See, for example, Pissarides (1998)
and Koskela and Schöb (1999).
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2. Workers value contributions paid by themselves more than those paid by employers,
the reason being that the latter are less salientto them.
The rst assumption is fairly standard in the literature of public pensions.4 The
government uses the revenue collected from payroll taxes to nance di¤erent public pro-
grams that benet workers. Workers may perceive a linkage between taxes paid today
and future benets. Taken to the extreme, if workers perceive future benets as actuarial,
payroll taxes will have no distortionary e¤ects.
The second assumption deserves more discussion. I begin by noting that in most
countries employers and employees share the statutory burden of the payroll tax. In
Figure A.1, I represent contributions paid by employers and employees in the OECD
countries. Average contribution by employers is 17.71%, while it is 9.76% for employees.
The ratio of the employer contribution to the sum of the employer and the employee
contribution ranges from 0 (Denmark and Chile) to 1 (Australia), with a mean of 0.64.
Contrary to employees, employers should perceive their part of the payroll tax as a pure
tax, as they do not get any future benet from it and, as long as they can, they will
try to shift the burden of the tax to their employees. Whether they will be successful or
not will depend on the corresponding elasticities of supply and demand, as commented
above.
Regarding employees, they may value taxes paid by the employer di¤erently from
taxes paid by themselves. One reason for this is that they may not be fully aware of
taxes paid by the employer on their behalf, or they may not know the true size of those
taxes. There is some evidence pointing out in this direction. In a very interesting paper,
Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) survey the opinions of 5,500 citizens in four
European countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) on their welfare states and also
on di¤erent possibilities of reform. One question asked for an estimate of the combined
employer and employee contribution. The questions was: As you know, both employers
and employees pay pension contributions. Which fraction of your gross monthly wage
goes to public pensions? (Please take into account also your employer contributions).
Several brackets were suggested. In Spain, the brackets were 0-21, 21-35, 35+. The
correct answer is 21-35. Half of individuals did not answer the question. Among those
who answered (49.2%), only 28% answered correctly while 68% chose the rst bracket
4See, for instance, Feldstein and Liebman (2002). Some earlier examples are Summers (1989) and
Gruber (1997).
3
(0-21).5
Recently, Fundación Edad y Vida questioned a sample of 1,200 individuals about their
knowledge of the welfare state in Spain and about di¤erent reform proposals. According
to the answers, individuals seem to over-value worker contributions and under-value em-
ployer contributions. In particular, one question asks for an estimate of the contributions
paid by the worker. Only 26% of respondents answer correctly. Interestingly, 30% choose
a value above the correct one, while only 2.5% choose a value below the correct one. The
remaining 41% do not answer the question. Another question asks for the combined em-
ployer and employee contribution. Most individuals do not answer (65%). Of those who
answer (35%), only 44% choose the right answer, 34% choose a value below the correct
one and 22% choose a value above the correct one.6
One possible explanation for this underestimation is that workers are only fully aware
of the contributions paid by themselves, but ignore or are not very sure about the size of
contributions paid by employers. In Spain, for instance, contributions paid by employers
do not even appear in the payroll statements that employees receive every month with
their wages.7 Their own contributions are, on the contrary, fully reected. This is related
to the literature on the visibility of taxes that goes back to Buchanan and Wagner
(1977). In particular, di¤erent authors have studied whether or not the sharing of payroll
taxes is irrelevant. Duek (2002) nds that, contrary to his initial intuition, countries
where employers share is large tend to have small pension programs. Mulligan, Gil, and
Sala-i-Martin (2010) nd that the employers share is slightly higher in democracies than
in nondemocracies.8 They also nd that the share paid by the employee has a positive
e¤ect on the size of the program, although this e¤ect is rather small. Chetty, Looney and
Kroft (2009) have coined the term salienceto refer to those taxes that are less visible for
consumers. Their main contribution is to show that commodity taxes that are included
in posted prices observed by consumers have a larger e¤ect on demand than taxes that
are not included in posted prices. For instance, if an excise tax is included in the posted
price, but a sales tax is not, consumers will react less to changes in the sales tax than to
5In another survey conducted by the same authors in Germany and Italy, only 20% of respondents
know the overall (employer plus employee) contribution rate approximately. See Tabellini, Börsch-Supan
and Boeri (2002).
6See Domínguez et al. (2010).
7There are countries in which workers also receive information on contributions paid by their employ-
ers. In the USA workers get this information in their Social Security Statements. Unfortunately, the
Social Security Administration has recently decided to stop mailing the statements due to budgetary
restrictions.
8See also Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999).
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changes in the excise tax. They claim that the reason is not that consumers ignore the
sales tax, but that they simply do not bother to compute tax-inclusive prices. They also
derive interesting implications for the e¢ ciency costs of taxation. In the standard set-up,
taxes that a¤ect demand very little entail small e¢ ciency costs. This result breaks down
with inattentive consumers. Consumers may end up spending too much on the taxed
good, reducing consumption of other commodities.9
Other authors have extended this paper by analyzing the issue of optimal tax design
under the presence of salience e¤ects.For instance, Goldin (2013) studies the problem
of a benevolent government that has to choose between high- and low-salience taxes on
a particular good in order to raise some required amount of money.
The argument of my paper is this: workers may not fully consider contributions paid
as taxes, since they acknowledge that these taxes give them the right to future benets.
Additionally, they behave myopically in the sense that they place a higher value on the
contributions paid by themselves than in the contributions paid by the employers, because
the latter are less salient. My paper is related to Chetty et al. in that I claim that, from
the viewpoint of workers, contributions paid by rms (the sales tax in Chetty et al.) are
less salient than contributions paid by workers (the excise tax in Chetty et al.). However,
the di¤erence is that under the two assumptions I introduce, changes in either employer
or employee contributions have little e¤ect on labor supply. Then, a policy reform that
moves part of the burden from rms to workers will have a positive e¤ect on employment.
The intuition is that this policy change a¤ects very little labor supply, but has a positive
e¤ect on labor demand.
In Section 2, I show that, provided workers value contributions, but employer contri-
butions are less salient for them, the negative e¤ect of taxes on employment is stronger
for employer contributions than for employee contributions. Next, I consider three alter-
native reforms that entail a reduction of the less salienttax (employer contributions)
coupled with an increase in the most salient tax (worker contributions). I nd that
these reforms have, in general, a positive e¤ect on the equilibrium level of employment
and also on welfare. The three reforms di¤er with respect to the e¤ect on total tax
revenue. In Section 3 I study a model based on the Mortensen-Pissarides search and
matching model. Interestingly, I nd that the results of Section 2 carry over to this new
framework. In particular, the reforms studied in those sections have the e¤ect of reducing
9See also Chetty (2009), Finkelstein (2009), Goldin and Homono¤ (2013), and Cabral and Hoxby
(2012).
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the equilibrium level of unemployment. Section 4 concludes.
2 Partial equilibrium: the competitive case
To illustrate my argument I will use the simplest possible model of a competitive labor
market.10 Labor demand is D(wF ); where wF = (1 + F )w and D0()  0: Here wF is
total labor cost for the rm, w is the posted wage that the rm pays to workers, and F
is the payroll tax rate paid by the rm. The value of social security contributions paid
by the rm is Fw. I want to stress that what matters for rms is wF ; not w:
Workers receive a net wage wN = (1 W )w; where W is the payroll tax rate paid by
workers. The value of social security contributions paid by the worker is Ww: Dening
 = F+W ; per worker revenue of the social security administration is w = (F+W )w.
Since wN = [(1  W )=(1+ F )]wF = [1  (W + F )=(1+ F )]wF ; the combination of
rm and worker payroll taxes is equivalent to a combined tax rate T = (W + F )=(1 +
F ) = =(1 + F ):
11
In a standard labor market model, labor supply would be S(wN); with S 0()  0: As I
said in the Introduction, I depart from this standard formulation in two directions. First,
workers may perceive contributions as deferred payments, since those contributions are
buying them some future benets. Since these benets will be collected in the future,
workers discount them by a factor . This parameter  captures the strength of the per-
ceived linkage between contributions and benets. It reects not only pure discounting,
but also institutional features of social security. For instance, how close to an actuarially
fair scheme is the social security system. If benets are strictly proportional to contribu-
tions, all workers will have similar values of : If social security is progressive, low-skilled
workers may have a higher value of  than high-skilled workers. The case  = 0 corre-
sponds to a situation in which social security contributions are perceived as pure taxes.
In many countries this can be the case for young workers since their current earnings
will not enter the formula used to calculate their future retirement benets. This could
likewise be the case of low-skilled workers who will qualify for a minimum pension.
Second, as discussed in Section 1, contributions paid by the worker and contributions
paid by the rm may not be equally salient. To model this asymmetry, I introduce a
parameter ' that takes values between 0 and 1 and that multiplies contributions paid by
10This model can be seen as a reduced-form of a standard intertemporal labor decision model.
11This is similar to Saez, Matsaganis, and Tsakloglou (2012).
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the rm. This parameter captures how salient are employer contributions. The higher is
'; the more salientthey are. When ' = 1, they are equally salient for the worker as
are workers contributions. When ' = 0 they are not salient at all.
To sum up, I assume that labor supply is S(wW ); where wW = (1  W )w + (W +
'F )w and S 0()  0: This formulation can be seen as a re-parametrization of Gruber
(1997).12 Employee contributions are discounted by a factor ; while employer contribu-
tions are discounted by '  : To save notation, I dene  = (1  W ) + (W + 'F ):
Then, wW = w: Note that if  = 0; we are back to the standard model of labor supply.
At the market equilibrium D((1 + F )w)  S(w): I consider changes in F and W
and compare how they a¤ect the equilibrium level of employment. I begin by studying
the e¤ect of a change in F : I di¤erentiate completely the equilibrium condition to get
D0((1 + F )dw + wdF )  S 0(dw + wd): Since d = 'dF ; I have:
D0((1 + F )
dw
wdF
+ 1)  S 0( dw
wdF
+ '): (1)
Given that dw
wdF
= d lnw
dF
; that d lnwF
dF
= d lnw
dF
+ 1
1+F
; and dening wage elasticities of labor
demand and supply (in absolute value) as "D =  D0 wD and "S = S 0wS ; respectively, I
obtain that the e¤ect on total labor costs is:
d lnwF
dF
=
(1  W (1  )  ')"S
(1 + F )("S + (1 + F )"D)
: (2)
The e¤ect of a change in F on the equilibrium level of employment is:
d lnL
dF
=   "D"S
"S + (1 + F )"D
(1  W (1  )  '): (3)
The derivative in (2) is positive and the derivative in (3) is negative.13 This is not
surprising, a rise in F increases total labor costs and reduces employment.
Now I study the e¤ect of a change in employee contributions W : In a similar way to
the one above, I obtain:
d lnwF
dW
=
(1  )"S
"S + (1 + F )"D
; (4)
12Using my notation, Gruber (1997) denes labor supply as:
S = S((1  aW )w + qFw);
where a and q reect how workers discount their contributions relative to cash income and how they value
employer contributions relative to cash income, respectively. I get my formulation by setting a = 1  ;
and q = ':
13To check this, note that we need 1  W (1 )+': The term on the right reaches a global maximum
when  = ' = 1; in which case its value is 1. In all other cases, its value is below 1.
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which is positive. Finally, the e¤ect on the level of employment is:
d lnL
dW
=   "D"S
"S + (1 + F )"D
(1  )(1 + F ); (5)
which has a negative sign, as d lnL
dF
. Again, a rise in W increases labor costs and reduces
employment.
I want to compare the e¤ect on employment of a change in F with a change of
the same size in W . That is, I want to compare
d lnLdF  with d lnLdW  : Using the above
expressions I get:d lnLdF
  d lnLdW
 = "D"S"S + (1 + F )"D [(1  ')  (1  ) ] : (6)
The term in brackets increases with  and falls with ': The standard case corresponds
to  = 0: In that case the term in brackets is   ; which means that starting from zero
taxation it is irrelevant whether to impose the tax on workers or on rms. The term in
brackets reaches a maximum value of 1 at  = 1 and ' = 0. It will be positive if the
parameter ' is below a certain threshold b'. In particular:
' < b' = 1  (1  )(1 + )

: (7)
This is the crucial result in this paper. As long as Condition (7) holds I get thatd lnLdF  > d lnLdW  : the reduction in employment after a 1% increase in F is higher than
the reduction in employment after a 1% increase in W : This same condition guarantees
that d lnwF
dF
> d lnwF
dW
: a 1% increase in F raises more total labor costs than a 1% increase
in W :14 The intuition for this result is simple. We know that an increase in either F
or W is detrimental for employment. However, the negative e¤ect of an increase in W
on employment is attenuated because this policy change increases the salience of social
security contributions.
If ' = 1 or  < 
1+
; Condition (7) is never satised.15 That is, two necessary
conditions for the result are ' < 1; employer contributions are less salient than employee
14Note that Condition (7) is both necessary and su¢ cient. That is, if ' > b'; we have that d lnLdF  <d lnLdW  : However, in this case the di¤erence between both terms is approximately zero as long as both
W and F are small. In fact, the di¤erence at the minimum ( = 0) is:d lnLdF
  d lnLdW
 =  "D"S(1  W )"S + (1 + F )"D ;
which is close to zero when  is small. This is the standard result saying that the e¤ect of an increase
in F is equal to the e¤ect of an increase in W , since economic incidence is determined only by the
elasticities of supply and demand.
15If  < 1+ ; then b' < 0:
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contributions, and   
1+
; workers give some value to contributions paid by themselves.
Condition (7) is weaker the lower  is and the higher  is. This condition says that, for
given values of  and ; the parameter ' cannot be too large.
To sum up, provided that Condition (7) holds, a reduction of F is more benecial
for employment than a comparable reduction of W : Interestingly, if social security is
progressive, Condition (7) is more likely to hold for low-skilled workers than for high-
skilled workers. The reason is that the former may have a higher value of ; since the
system is progressive, and a lower value of '; as they may be more myopic than high-
skilled workers.
Next I compare the e¤ect on employment, on welfare, and on tax revenue of three
alternative reforms. All of them have in common that there is a reduction of the less
salienttax (F ) together with an increase of the most salienttax (W ). The main
conclusion is that, since all of them reduce the excess burden of taxation, they have a
positive e¤ect on aggregate welfare.
2.1 Reform 1: keeping constant the combined tax rate
This reform reduces F and, at the same time, raises W such that the combined tax rate
T remains unchanged. If dF < 0; the exact increase needed in W is:
dW =  (1  T )dF =  (1  W )
(1 + F )
dF > 0: (8)
For instance, assume that initially W = 0:08 and F = 0:15: Then,  = 0:23 and the
combined tax rate is T = 0:2: If we reduce F by 1 percentage point (dF =  0:01), to
keep constant T we have to increase W by 0.8 percentage points (dW = 0:008): The
situation after this reform is  0W = 0:088, 
0
F = 0:14; 
0 = 0:228; while T is still 0:2:
This reform induces rst a negative e¤ect on employment, because of the rise in W ;
and second a positive e¤ect, because of the reduction in F : To calculate the overall e¤ect I
have to compare these two e¤ects. However, it is immediate to see that
 d lnL(1 T )dF  > d lnLdW 
as long as ' < 1= which is always the case provided that ' < 1 and  > 0: Then, this
reform is always positive for employment. In particular, I get:
d lnL
dF

T
=
 "D"S
"S + (1 + F )"D
(1  ')
1 + F
< 0; (9)
where the notation T refers to the fact that the combined tax rate is kept constant. It is
easy to see that the e¤ect of this policy change on welfare is positive. The reason is that
it reduces the deadweight loss of taxation. See Figure 1 below for an illustration.
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In general this reform will reduce total revenue of the social security administration.
Total revenue is R = (W +F )wL = wFLT: Since T is xed with this reform, to nd the
e¤ect on total tax revenue R we have to study the e¤ect on wFL: I nd that a reduction
on F will have a negative e¤ect on wFL if and only if the elasticity of labor demand is
less than 1 ("D < 1):16 According to Hamermesh (1993), the most plausible interval for
the elasticity of labor demand is [0:15; 0:75]. Moreover, he proposes 0.3 as the best point
estimate. Then this reform will reduce total revenue R:
2.2 Reform 2: keeping constant  = W + F
Now I consider a policy reform in which dW =  dF > 0; so that  = W + F
remains unchanged. Using the example above, the situation after this reform would be
 0W = 0:09, 
0
F = 0:14: Now the combined tax rate rises to T
0 = 0:2017: If Condition (7)
holds, this policy change reduces total labor costs for rms and has, therefore, a positive
e¤ect on employment. Given that  = (1   W ) + (W + 'F ); if dW =  dF then
d = (1   + ')dF : The e¤ect on total labor cost wF = w(1 + F ) is:
d lnwF
dF


=
"S
"S + (1 + F )"D
((1  ')  (1  ) )
1 + F
: (10)
The e¤ect on employment is:
d lnL
dF


=   "D"S
"S + (1 + F )"D
((1  ')  (1  ) )
1 + F
: (11)
If the parameter  is strictly positive, the signs of the derivatives in Equations (10) and
(11) are determined by the sign of the term (1   ')   (1   ) : We know that, under
Condition (7), that term is positive. This implies that the expression in Equation (10) is
positive and the expression in Equation (11) is negative. That is, shifting some part of
the contributions from employers to employees, while holding xed the total contribution
rate, reduces total labor costs for the rm and, thus, has a positive e¤ect on employment.17
16We can compute easily:
d(wFL)
dF

T
= wFL

"S(1  ')
"S + (1 + F )"D
1
1 + F

(1  "D):
17If  = 0; the term d lnwdF


is approximately -1, as long as W and F are not very large. This is
the classical result of full shifting where the equilibrium wage depends only on the value of  ; and not
on how this tax is split between employers and employees. Additionally, when  = 0 both d lnwFdF


and
d lnL
dF


are approximately zero as long as  is small. As long as total tax  does not change, labor costs
wF and employment L are not a¤ected by how contributions are split between worker and rm. It does
not matter who bears the statutory burden of the tax.
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Figure 1 here
Figure 1 illustrates the e¤ect of shifting part of employer contributions to employees
and can be used to see the intuition behind the result. Dotted lines D(w) and S(w)
represent labor demand and supply in the absence of taxes. Thin lines D(w(1+ F )) and
S(w) represent the initial situation. I then reduce F and raise W ; holding constant
the sum  = F + W : Since contributions are perceived as pure taxes by rms, the
reduction of F to  0F has a positive e¤ect on employment represented by the shift to the
right of labor demand. The rise in worker contributions, from W to  0W , is negative for
employment and I represent this with the shift to the left of labor supply. New supply and
demand curves are represented in bold lines. In standard models these two e¤ects cancel
each other, and total employment remains unchanged. In my model, if Condition (7)
holds, this change in the split raises the salient part of contributions, implying that the
(negative) e¤ect on supply is always smaller in size than the (positive) e¤ect on demand.
The overall e¤ect on employment is positive. In the gure it goes from L to L0:
The positive e¤ect on welfare is also illustrated in the gure. The initial excess burden
is represented by the triangle ADE. This reform reduces the excess burden in an amount
that is represented by the trapezoid BDEC, while the excess burden after the reform is
represented by the triangle ABC. This reform entails a net gain to society.
The rise in wW may seem counterintuitive. However, recall that wW does not only
represent the net wage that workers get, but also the value that workers give to their
future benets. In fact, the net wage wN gets lower with this reform.
Finally, total tax revenue R = (W + F )wL increases with this reform. As the sum
W + F does not change, the e¤ect depends on wL: But both w and L rise after the
reduction of F :
2.3 Reform 3: a revenue-neutral reform
This third reform entails a reduction in F ; coupled with an increase in W by an amount
that keeps total revenue R constant. In particular, if dF < 0; the change needed in W
is exactly:
dW
dF

R
=  
dR
dF
dR
dW
=  
1 + 

d lnw
dF
+ d lnL
dF

1 + 

d lnw
dW
+ d lnL
dW
 ; (12)
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where the notation R means that revenue is kept constant.
I focus on the case in which Condition (7) holds. In that case I know that
d lnLdF  >d lnLdW  : I also know that d lnwdW > 0 and d lnwdF < 0: Then, I have that dWdF R <  1: A
revenue-neutral reduction in F is associated with an overall reduction in  = F + W :
Then, this reform has also a positive e¤ect on employment L and, therefore, on welfare.
Finally, the e¤ect on the combined tax rate T is ambiguous.
2.4 On the size of the e¤ects
Here I present a numerical example to give an idea of the size of the e¤ects on employment
of the three proposals above. To do this I need values for the elasticities of demand and
supply and also values for the four parameters in the model: F ; W ; ; and ': I assume
that both elasticities are constant. Following Hamermesh (1993), I choose "D = 0:3:
Regarding "S a reasonable value can be 0:1: I take the mean values of F and W in the
OECD countries in 2013. In particular, F = 0:1771 and W = 0:0976:
Before calculating the e¤ects of the three reforms, I use as a benchmark the case
 = 0; which is the standard model of labor supply. For this case I get d lnwF
dF
= 0:1839;
and d lnL
dF
=  0:0649: These derivatives correspond to those in Equations (2) and (11),
respectively. In the standard model an increase in F from 0:1771 to 0:1871 increases
wF a 0.18%, and reduces employment a 0.06%. I will use as a benchmark the e¤ect on
employment. To see the size of the e¤ects of the three reforms I do the following. I
compute the e¤ect of the three alternative reforms on employment L for di¤erent values
of  and '; and I divide that e¤ect by
d lnLdF  = 0:0649: In this way I get an idea of the
relative size of these e¤ects. Table 1 below presents a summary of these e¤ects.
Table 1: The relative size of the e¤ects
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3
 = 0 0 -0.258 0
 = 0:5 ' = 1 0 -0.258 0
' = 0:75 0.184 -0.018 0.180
' = 0:5 0.303 0.136 0.297
' = 0:25 0.385 0.244 0.378
' = 0 0.446 0.323 0.438
 = 0:75 ' = 1 0 -0.258 0
' = 0:75 0.385 0.244 0.381
' = 0:5 0.530 0.433 0.525
' = 0:25 0.606 0.532 0.600
' = 0 0.653 0.593 0.647
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First note that in the standard model ( = 0); reforms 1 and 3 have no e¤ect at all on
employment, while Reform 2 has a negative impact on employment. The same happens
when  is either 0.5 or 0.75 and ' is 1. This is because in these cases Condition (7) does
not hold. In the table I write in bold type those cases where this condition is satised.
I also see that the relative e¤ect on employment gets higher as ' declines. For instance,
when  = 0:75 and ' = 0:5; the three reforms have a positive e¤ect on employment that
is roughly half of the e¤ect (in absolute value) of an increase in F in the standard model.
I also nd that the rst reform is the one with a stronger impact on employment, then
the third reform, and nally the second reform. However, there is a trade-o¤ between the
two objectives of increasing employment and increasing revenue. Reform 1 is the most
positive for employment, but entails a reduction in tax revenue. Reform 2 is the most
positive for revenue, but has less e¤ect on employment. Finally, Reform 3 is in between
the two others. In Table 2 I present a summary of the three reforms in terms of their
e¤ects on the combined tax rate T; tax revenue R; employment and welfare:
Table 2: Summary of the three reforms
Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3
T = * ?
 = W + F + = +
R + * =
L * * *
Welfare * * *
* As long as Condition (7) holds.
3 A model of equilibrium unemployment
The main drawback of the model in Section 2 is that there is no equilibrium unemploy-
ment. Here I build a simple model based on the canonical Mortensen-Pissarides search
and matching model to see how a change in the salienceof the tax a¤ects unemploy-
ment (see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). I will use the simplest version of the MP
model as described in Chapter 1 of Pissarides (2000). This is a model in which di¤erent
frictions in the labor market produce equilibrium unemployment in the steady state.
Since the extension is very straightforward I will spend some time to discuss only
the changes needed to adapt it to my framework. Recall that this simple version of the
MP model is described by three equations: (i) the Beveridge curve, (ii) the job creation
condition, and (iii) the wage equation. I will present these three equations in turn.
13
The Beveridge curve (BC), (Equation (1.5) in Pissarides, 2000) can be written as:
u =

+ q()
; (13)
where u is the unemployment rate,  = v=u measures labor market tightness (v is
the fraction of vacant jobs as a fraction of the labor force),  is the Poisson rate of
the shocks to occupied jobs that determines the ow to unemployment, and q() is the
instantaneous probability of a vacancy being lled. The Beveridge curve is obtaining
by assuming that the mean rate of unemployment is constant. Then, the ow into
unemployment ((1   u)) and the ow out of unemployment (q()u) must be equal.
As it is well known, the properties of the matching technology imply that q0()  0:
When  is high there are many vacancies and rms with a vacancy nd it di¢ cult to
get a match with an unemployed worker. The Beveridge curve has negative slope in the
tightness-unemployment space (; u) and it says that, for given  and ; there is a unique
equilibrium unemployment rate. The two remaining equations of the model will serve to
determine the value of market tightness :
The job creation curve (Equation (1.9) in Pissarides, 2000) requires a slight modi-
cation, since in my setup the cost of labor to rms includes employer contributions. A
rm earns V with a vacancy and earns J if the job is lled. The arbitrage equation for
a rm with a vacancy is:
rV =  pc+ q()(J   V ); (14)
where r is the interest rate and pc is the cost of a vacant job per unit of time. This
equation says that the capital cost of the asset (rV ) has to be equal to the return on
the asset. The return has two components, a dividendwhich is the search cost, plus
an expected capital gain, which is the possibility of nding a worker. Since there is free
entry of rms with a vacancy, we have V = 0; and this implies:
J =
pc
q()
: (15)
The value of a lled job is exactly the expected cost of creating it.
A rm with an occupied job has the arbitrage condition:
rJ = p  (1 + F )w   J; (16)
where p > 0 is the xed value of a jobs output and (1 + F )w is the cost of labor,
including payroll taxes paid by the rm. The job yields p   (1 + F )w to the rm but
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there is a risk  of an adverse shock. Using Equation (15), I obtain the job creation (JC)
condition:
p  (1 + F )w   (r + )pc
q()
= 0: (17)
The term (r+)pc
q()
represents the capitalized value of the rms hiring costs. The only
change with respect to Pissarides is that I have to write (1 + F )w instead of w: As
long as rm search costs are positive (c > 0); workers do not get their marginal product.
Again, the fact that q0()  0 guarantees that the job creation curve slopes down in
the tightness-wage space (; w): When wages are high, job creation is not protable and
the ratio of vacancies to workers is low. The introduction of the employer contribution
reduces the value that has an occupied job for the rm. For a given wage w; the zero
prot condition holds for a lower value of market-tightness. In the space (; w) this means
that the introduction of the tax shifts the JC curve to the left.
The wage equation (Equation (1.20) in Pissarides, 2000) is the one that deserves more
attention. Workers are risk neutral and care only for the present value of their present
and future income streams. A worker earns w (recall that (1   W ) + (W + 'F ))
when employed and is searching for a job when unemployed. She earns an unemployment
benet z during search. I assume that the unemployment benet is untaxed. I call U
and V the present discounted value of the income streams of an unemployed and of an
employed worker, respectively. The arbitrage equation for an unemployed worker is:
rU = z + q()(W   U): (18)
The interpretation is that the capital cost of the asset (rU) has to be equal to the return
on the asset. In this case the asset is the human capital of the unemployed worker. The
return on the asset contains a dividend(the unemployment benet z) and an expected
capital gain (upgrading from unemployment to employment).
The corresponding arbitrage equation for an employed worker is:
rW = w + (U  W ): (19)
Again I have on the left the capital cost of the asset (rW ) and on the right the return on
the asset. The return contains a dividend(the wage w; that contains the value that
the worker assigns to social contributions) and an expected capital loss (downgrading
from employment to unemployment).
I assume that the rm and the worker bargain over the wage. As is standard in the
literature, I assume that the expected gains from a match are split between the rm and
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the worker according to the Nash bargaining solution. To compute this solution, I have
to calculate the expected gains from a match for the rm and the worker. When the
wage is wi; the expected return for a rm, Ji; satises the equation:
rJi = p  (1 + F )wi   Ji: (20)
In case of disagreement, the standard assumption is that the rm gets 0.
The expected gain of a match for a worker is Wi; where:
rWi = wi   (Wi   U): (21)
The wage wi obtained from the Nash bargaining solution is the one that maximizes
the weighted Nash product:
max
wi
(Wi   U)(Ji   V )1 ;
where 0    1 is the workers bargaining power.Here the threat point of the worker
is unemployment (U) and the threat point for the rm is an unoccupied job (V = 0).
The rst-order condition is:
Wi   U = (Wi + Ji   U   V ): (22)
Labor obtains a fraction  of the total surplus created by a match. Using equations (20)
and (21) above, I can convert this into:
wi[(1  ) + (1 + F )] = rU + (p  rU): (23)
Without taxes, the term that multiplies wi is equal to 1, since in that case  = 1: I use
equations (15), (18), (20) and (21) to obtain the aggregate wage equation (WE):
w
 = (1  )z + p(1 + c); (24)
where 
 = (1 )+(1+F ): This equation corresponds to Equation 1.20 in Pissarides
(2000). The only di¤erence is the term 
. The wage equation is upward-sloping in the
space (; w):When the number of vacancies per unemployed worker is high, workers have
a good outside option and they can ask for a high wage. Note that both the employer
and the employee contribution appear in the term 
. Taxes reduce workersincentives to
search for a job, since employee contributions reduce the net surplus from a job. Again,
as in Section 2, the two crucial assumptions of the paper mitigate this negative e¤ect.
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An equilibrium is a triple (u; ; w) that satises the three equations (13), (17), and
(24). The model is recursive and can be solved sequentially. Equations (17) and (24)
determine the equilibrium values of  and w: Once  is known, Equation (13) is used to
determine u:
Now I will use this model to study the e¤ects of some of the reforms studied in Section
2. To save space I will focus only on Reform 2.
We are interested in the e¤ect on  of a policy change in which dW =  dF > 0:
The crucial point is to study the e¤ect of this reform on market tightness : If this reform
has the e¤ect of increasing , we know from the Beveridge curve (Equation (13)) that
equilibrium unemployment will fall. Then, to see the e¤ect of this reform on market
tightness I have to study its e¤ect on the job creation condition (Equation (17)) and on
the wage equation (Equation (24)). The reduction in F gives rms more incentives to
open additional vacancies, since the surplus they earn on a job increases. In the space
(; w) the reduction in F shifts the JC curve to the right. A given wage w is compatible
with a higher vacancy-unemployment ratio as shown in Figure 2 below.
With respect to the wage equation, the increase in employee contributions W raises
for workers the net value of the outside option in wage bargaining since the unemployment
benet z is not taxed. Then, the wage curve shifts to the left in the space (; w); as shown
in Figure 2 below. To see this, note that the e¤ect of this policy change on the parameter

 is:
d

dF
= (1  )(1   + ') +  > 0: (25)
Since there is a reduction in F ; the term 
 gets lower. So, in principle these two e¤ects
go in opposite directions. To see the nal e¤ect on  I have to see which one of them
dominates. However, under the assumptions of the paper we can see that the positive
e¤ect on the job creation condition dominates. The intuition is similar to what we have
seen in Section 2. Workers place a high value in the deferred benets they get with the
contributions they pay, so an increase in these contributions does not have much impact
on the net surplus they get from a job. The formal proof of this net positive e¤ect on 
is as follows. I substitute wages from (24) into (17) to get:
p  (1 + F )

(1  )z + p(1 + c)



  (r + )pc
q()
= 0: (26)
This equation determines the equilibrium value of : The overall e¤ect of the reform on
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market tightness can be obtained by using the Implicit Function Theorem to compute:
d
dF
=  
d()
dF
d()
d
; (27)
where the term () is a short-hand for Equation (26). It is easy to check that d()
d
< 0:
This implies that the sign of d
dF
will be the sign of the term in the numerator, d()
dF
. Next,
I check that:
d()
dF
=

p  (r + )pc
q()

d

dF
  (1  )z   (1 + c)p =
= (1 + F )w
d

dF
  
w =

(1 + F )
d

dF
  


w: (28)
In the second line I have made used of equations (17) and (24). Interestingly, the term
in brackets can be simplied into (1  )[(1  )   (1 ')]: This term will be negative
if Condition (7) holds. But, since under this policy reform there is a reduction in F ;
this means that equilibrium market tightness  will increase. Then, using Equation (13)
I know that the equilibrium level of unemployment will be lower.
Figure 2 here
Figure 2 summarizes all the above discussion. Initial market tightness is 0 in Figure
2. This reform moves the job creation curve to the right and the wage curve to the
left. Under Condition (7) the rst e¤ect dominates, increasing market tightness to 1:
In the right-hand panel we see that this has the e¤ect of reducing the equilibrium level
of unemployment. The intuition is again that, under the assumptions behind Condition
(7), this policy reform has little e¤ect on workers behavior.
4 Final remarks and conclusions
In this paper I nd that, contrary to the prediction of standard economic theory, the way
in which social security contributions are split between employers and employees matters
for the level of employment. In particular, I nd that contributions paid by rms are more
harmful for employment than contributions paid by workers. To obtain this result I need
two conditions. First, workers must attach some value to social security contributions.
Second, workers must value their own contributions more than those paid by employers.
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I consider three alternative reforms that entail a reduction of the less salient tax
(employer contributions), coupled with an increase of the most salienttax (employee
contributions). They di¤er according to the e¤ect they have on total tax revenue. Reform
1 reduces tax revenue, Reform 2 raises tax revenue, and Reform 3 keeps it constant.
Reform 1 unambiguously raises employment, while the positive e¤ect of reforms 2 and 3
on employment depends on whether Condition (7) holds or not. The e¤ect on welfare is
also positive whenever there is an increase in the equilibrium employment level. I nd
that there is a trade-o¤ between the two objectives of increasing employment and raising
tax revenue.
I think it is interesting to remark how a simple model with a representative agent
can still produce interesting policy conclusions. Clearly, a model with heterogeneous
individuals would be even more interesting, since I could model di¤erent individuals as
su¤ering from di¤erent degrees of myopia. I leave this extension for future work.
I also show that the main results carry over to a search and matching model in which
there is equilibrium unemployment. That is, the same reforms I have studied in the
partial competitive model, now have the e¤ect of reducing equilibrium unemployment
when applied to the MP model.
As a nal comment I want to mention the e¤ects of a simple policy that consists of
making employer contributions more salient to workers. One example in this line was the
decision of the Social Security Administration in the USA to send the so-called Social
Security Statement to all workers paying payroll taxes.18 The Social Security Statement
of a ctional worker, called Wanda Worker, can be downloaded from the US Social
Security website. It contains a detailed account of taxes paid both by the worker and
by her employers throughout her full working career to present. A similar idea could be
easily implemented in other countries, such as Spain, at a low cost. Another possibility
could be to include information about employer contributions in the monthly statements
that workers receive. In terms of my simple model, this would amount to raise the value
of ': Within the model of Section 2 it is immediate to show that this simple policy
has always a positive e¤ect on employment. The intuition is straightforward. Making
employer contributions more salient to workers has no e¤ect on labor demand, but it has
a positive e¤ect on supply, as long as rms pay contributions (F > 0) and workers give
them some value ( > 0). This policy measure entails few costs and can prove useful
18See Mastrobuoni (2011).
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for increasing employment.19 In fact, this was one of the proposals in the report that
the Swedish government commissioned to analyze the countrys economic crisis in the
Nineties. Quoting the report:
42. Taxes should be made as visible as possible; they should also be called taxes and
not fees; the gross wage, including payroll taxes, should be reported along with the wage
payment.(Lindbeck et al. (1994, p. 103)).
19In the context of the MP model of Section 3, this policy change has always the e¤ect of reducing the
equilibrium level of unemployment. The reason is that it only a¤ects the wage curve, shifting it to the
right, while it does not a¤ect the job creation curve.
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